Inside the expanding Gaza buffer zone: Is Israel building for security or staying for good?
Inside the expanding Gaza buffer zone: Is Israel building for security or staying for good?
A look at the Netzarim Corridor, its strategic significance, and the debates surrounding its creation.
In recent months, a new border crossing was established near Kibbutz Be’eri, nicknamed "Terminal 3." Around the crossing, there is a makeshift parking lot where hundreds of private cars, buses, trucks, and military vehicles are parked. Among the vehicles and hundreds of soldiers, volunteers tirelessly hand out schnitzel sandwiches, regardless of the fact that it is not yet 10 in the morning. "Terminal 3" is now the main entry point to Gaza and the area known as the Netzarim Corridor. The IDF is attempting to rebrand it as the "Be’eri Corridor," but this name has not yet gained traction.
The Netzarim Corridor is a large buffer zone centered on the Netzarim Axis, stretching across Gaza from the area of Kibbutz Be’eri to the seashore. The Netzarim Axis is about 7 km long, with the IDF clearing an area approximately 3 km wide on either side. This has turned the corridor into a near-sterile rectangle of over 40 square kilometers in the heart of the Gaza Strip. To the north of the Netzarim Corridor lies Gaza City, while to the south are the Bureij and Nuseirat refugee camps.
The Netzarim Corridor was not created on empty land. Before the war, the Palestinian town of Al-Muharraqa occupied the area, but its buildings were entirely destroyed during the conflict as part of land clearing operations. The area also housed a university, a hospital, and a large amusement park, remnants of which are still visible.
The Netzarim Corridor is traversed by two longitudinal axes intended to facilitate the movement of Gazans from the northern Gaza Strip to the south. Israeli authorities initially believed that the launch of a recent wide scale operation in northern Gaza, particularly in Jabaliya (marking the IDF's third incursion into the area since the war began), would result in a mass migration of Gazans southward. However, this assumption proved incorrect. Only about 300 Gazans have moved through the corridor from north to south in the past two and a half months, despite the IDF’s extensive preparations and installation of facial recognition cameras along two IDF-controlled traffic axes—the Salah al-Din road (an extension of Israeli Route 4) and a route near the seashore.
If the political leadership sought to relocate all Palestinians north of Netzarim to the southern Gaza Strip, as claimed this week by Minister Bezalel Smotrich during a faction meeting of the Religious Zionism Party, this effort has largely failed. Residents of northern Gaza towns like Jabaliya, Beit Lahia, and Beit Hanoun have indeed left those areas, but they have crowded into Gaza City instead of crossing the Netzarim Corridor. Israeli estimates suggest that approximately 200,000 to 300,000 Gazans remain in Gaza City and the area north of the corridor.
Until recently, the main road in the Netzarim Corridor was a military dirt track. Over the past few weeks, however, the IDF has begun upgrading it with asphalt to create a fully functional road. Civil contractors are working at a rapid pace to complete the project. This advanced road complements a series of outposts built in recent months within the corridor and other infrastructure established in the area, such as civilian cellular antennas.
The IDF claims that nearly all of this infrastructure can be dismantled and removed within 48 hours, with the Netzarim Corridor "folded" back to Israel. The infrastructure was deliberately designed to be portable; for example, cellular antennas are mounted on mobile platforms rather than concrete bases, and buildings at the outposts—including protected living quarters, restrooms, showers, and interrogation rooms—are repurposed older structures transported by trucks.
The IDF asserts that this infrastructure is purely operational. Communication systems are designed to facilitate military activities, asphalted roads are intended for winter mobility, and the outposts aim to provide soldiers with reasonable living conditions, including protection, showers, and communication with home.
Regarding a possible evacuation in the event of a ceasefire or a hostage deal, the IDF believes that the residents of Israel’s Gaza border communities can be protected without a permanent military presence inside Gaza. The plan would involve withdrawing from the Netzarim Corridor and the Philadelphi Corridor while creating a buffer zone 1 km wide along Gaza’s border to keep Gazans away from the security fence. This would allow the IDF to maintain control from elevated positions overlooking the Strip. These positions reflect a willingness within the military echelon to make greater territorial concessions in Gaza than the political leadership has suggested.
Statements from the IDF about the temporary nature of the corridor and its infrastructure aim to counter claims that Israel is preparing for a military administration or future settlements in Gaza. If the IDF does not vacate the areas of Philadelphi, Netzarim, and Jabaliya or allow Gazans to return, accusations of ethnic cleansing in Gaza could gain credibility.
Data obtained by Calcalist shows that the Israeli security establishment has spent at least hundreds of millions of shekels on infrastructure within Gaza, though the total costs may be significantly higher.
Netzarim Corridor is not the only location where new roads and infrastructure have been developed. The IDF previously upgraded the Philadelphi Corridor in southwestern Gaza, creating a kilometer-wide buffer zone along the border. Additionally, a new logistical-operational axis is being built to separate Jabaliya from Gaza City. Extensive drilling operations by civilian contractors are also ongoing to locate underground tunnels.
Visitors to Israeli-controlled areas of Gaza today will observe numerous civilian tools and equipment operated by contractors, including cranes, trucks, and earthmoving machinery. The Ministry of Defense's price list for "mobilized equipment" reveals significant costs: excavators range from NIS 385 per day for smaller models to NIS 2,362 for 70-ton hydraulic excavators. Road scrapers cost NIS 756–1,560 daily, while cranes and drilling machines can cost up to NIS 28,000 per day.
At the western edge of the Netzarim Corridor lies the massive logistics area cleared to operate the Americans floating pier for delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza by sea. Despite a $230 million investment, the pier operated for only 20 days, transferring just 8,100 tons of goods compared to the 900,000 tons transported by land since the war began. The pier's failure, attributed to unsuitable conditions in the Mediterranean, now stands as a metaphor for U.S. intervention in the region.
On the way out of the Netzarim Corridor, I met a reservist near the entrance to Terminal 3. When he learned that I was an economic reporter, he began discussing the civilian investments being made in the Gaza Strip. "It’s a positive move, even if we eventually leave," he said, offering a brief lesson in economics. "This is an example of expansionary Keynesian policy." The renowned economist John Maynard Keynes famously argued that even seemingly unproductive government projects—such as digging holes and filling them up again—can stimulate economic activity and encourage growth.
While one might disagree with the reservist’s conclusion, a tour of the Strip underscored how much the war has driven economic activity in Israel. From work for contracting companies to employment for tens of thousands of reservists, and the livelihoods of the logistics providers supporting the army.
If the country halts the war, however, this economic activity would cease overnight, along with the generous reparations payments. Only then might the Israeli economy face the reality of its dependence on government-driven stimulation. "After the war, economic prosperity always follows," the reservist concluded. Let’s hope he’s right and that we don’t instead face the kind of economic stagnation that followed the Yom Kippur War.
