Have missiles from the Iranian-backed Houthis discovered a loophole in Israeli air defenses?
Have missiles from the Iranian-backed Houthis discovered a loophole in Israeli air defenses?
Experts warn of evolving missile threats after strikes on Jaffa and Ramat Gan expose vulnerabilities in the Arrow system.
"We are witnessing an arms race for all intents and purposes, with Iran, through the Houthi rebels in Yemen, constantly trying to improve its ability to strike Israel with its surface-to-surface missiles. On the other hand, Israel always strives to be a step ahead, but it does not always succeed. It may be that in recent days a loophole has been exposed in the air defense system, and the question is how soon we will close it and how," an expert in anti-missile defense told Calcalist, against the backdrop of missile strikes from Yemen on central Israel over the last several days.
On Saturday, a missile launched from Yemen toward Israel was not intercepted despite several attempts and struck a playground between two buildings in Jaffa. Two days earlier, the air defense system struggled to intercept another missile from Yemen, which hit and destroyed a school building in Ramat Gan.
In both cases, Arrow missiles launched by Israel's air defense system failed to neutralize the threats. These interceptor missiles, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), are designed to destroy ballistic missiles at high altitudes, outside the atmosphere. Preliminary investigations revealed that during the first incident, the interceptor struck the rear of the Yemeni missile but failed to destroy it entirely, allowing the warhead to continue its descent and hit the target. Similarly, the missile that struck Jaffa on Saturday survived all attempts at interception.
Professional sources estimate that the missiles launched from Yemen belong to the Iranian-made Fatah family. These missiles have reportedly undergone modifications to extend their range to up to 2,000 kilometers while improving their survivability against Israeli defense systems. According to an expert, the increased range and enhanced maneuvering capabilities come at the expense of payload capacity, but they still pose a significant challenge to interception systems. One possibility is that the missiles were equipped with rocket-powered warheads capable of maneuvering upon re-entry into the atmosphere, thereby increasing their resistance to interception.
"There may be a gap here that requires adjustments, whether technical adjustments or changes in combat doctrine," the expert noted. "These could involve modifications in the control and guidance logic or in the operational framework. On the surface, these adjustments might seem straightforward, but I am convinced that this is not the case. It will likely require a technological response, but not necessarily a new interceptor missile. The necessary updates can probably be implemented within the existing systems. However, this will take time, especially to ensure that addressing one loophole does not create another."
The expert added: "This arms race is not always pleasant, but strategically it should be advantageous for Israel. Iran, which is now managing its front against us through the Houthis and arming them, is revealing its best capabilities, allowing us to improve our defense systems."
Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, the Houthi rebels have launched approximately 400 ballistic missiles and explosive drones toward Israel. Most were intercepted shortly after detection by Arrow 3 or Arrow 2 missiles, or by allied forces operating in the Red Sea under the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). However, despite vigilance and the significant distance between Israel and Yemen, which should provide ample early warning, some drones launched by the Houthis have evaded detection systems and penetrated Israeli airspace, only being identified too late to be intercepted mid-flight.
Following the recent interception failures, the Israeli Air Force has launched an investigation involving Israel Aerospace Industries, the developer and manufacturer of the Arrow 3 and Arrow 2 interceptors and their radar systems. These systems were central in defending Israel against two large-scale missile attacks directly orchestrated by Iran in April and October. The investigation is focusing on various questions, including the time lapse between missile launches and detection, as well as optimal interception methods. Typically, when an Arrow 3 interceptor fails to neutralize a target, the air defense system should have sufficient time to deploy Arrow 2 or David's Sling interceptors as backups.
According to an IDF spokesperson, the missile strike in Jaffa is still under investigation, and preliminary lessons from the attack are already being implemented in both interception and warning systems. The IDF did not disclose specific measures due to information security concerns but reiterated that air defense systems are not foolproof and urged the public to continue following Home Front Command directives.
